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Abstract
Differentially private (DP) machine learning has recently become popular. The privacy
loss of DP algorithms is commonly reported using (ε, δ)-DP. In this paper, we propose a
numerical accountant for evaluating the privacy loss for algorithms with continuous one
dimensional output. This accountant can be applied to the subsampled multidimensional
Gaussian mechanism which underlies the popular DP stochastic gradient descent. The pro-
posed method is based on a numerical approximation of an integral formula which gives
the exact (ε, δ)-values. The approximation is carried out by discretising the integral and by
evaluating discrete convolutions using the fast Fourier transform algorithm. We give both
theoretical error bounds and numerical error estimates for the approximation. Experimental
comparisons with state-of-the-art techniques demonstrate significant improvements in bound
tightness and/or computation time. Python code for the method can be found in Github.1
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [9] has clearly been established as the dominant paradigm for
privacy-preserving machine learning. Early work on DP machine learning focused on single
shot perturbations for convex problems (e.g. [7]), while contemporary research has focused
on iterative algorithms such as DP stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [16, 18, 2] .
Evaluating the privacy loss of an iterative algorithm is based on the composition theory
of DP. The so-called advanced composition theorem of [11] showed how to trade decreased
ε with slightly increased δ in (, δ)-DP. This was further improved e.g. by [12]. The privacy
amplification by subsampling [6, 5, 4, 23] is another component that has been studied to
improve the privacy bounds.
1https://github.com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant/
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A major breakthrough in obtaining tighter composition bounds came from using the
entire privacy loss profile of DP algorithms instead of single (ε, δ)-values. This was first
introduced by the moments accountant [2]. The development of Rényi differential privacy
(RDP) [14] allowed tight bounds on the privacy cost of composition, and recently proposed
amplification theorems for RDP [3, 22] showed how subsampling affects the privacy cost of
RDP. In [24] tight RDP bounds were given for the Poisson subsampling method.
Using the recently introduced privacy loss distribution (PLD) formalism [17], we com-
pute tight (ε, δ)-DP bounds on the composition of subsampled Gaussian mechanisms, using
discrete Fourier transforms to evaluate the required convolutions. We show numerically that
the achieved privacy bounds are tighter than those obtained by Rényi DP compositions and
the moments accountant.
Within this computational framework, in addition to the commonly considered Poisson
subsampling method, we are also able to compute tight privacy bounds for the subsampling
with replacement and subsampling without replacement methods.
2 Differential Privacy
We first recall some basic definitions of differential privacy [10]. We use the following no-
tation. An input dataset containing N data points is denoted as X = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ XN ,
where xi ∈ X , 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Definition 1. We say two datasets X and Y are neighbours in remove/add relation if you
get one by removing/adding an element from/to to other and denote it with ∼R. We say X
and Y are neighbours in substitute relation if you get one by substituting one element in the
other. We denote this with ∼S.
Definition 2. Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let ∼ define a neighbouring relation. Mechanism
M : XN → R is (ε, δ,∼)-DP if for every X ∼ Y and every measurable set E ⊂ R it holds
that
Pr(M(X) ∈ E) ≤ eεPr(M(Y ) ∈ E) + δ.
When the relation is clear from context or irrelevant, we will abbreviate it as (ε, δ)-DP. We
callM tightly (ε, δ,∼)-DP, if there does not exist δ′ < δ such thatM is (ε, δ′,∼)-DP.
3 Privacy loss distribution
We first introduce the basic tool for obtaining tight privacy bounds: the privacy loss distri-
bution (PLD).
The results in this section can be seen as continuous versions of their discrete counterparts
given in [13] and [17]. Detailed proofs are given in Appendix. The results apply for both
neighbouring relations ∼S and ∼R.
We consider mechanisms M : XN → R which give as an output distributions with
support equaling R.
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Definition 3. Let M : XN → R be a randomised mechanism and let X ∼ Y . Let fX(t)
denote the density function of M(X) and fY (t) the density function of M(Y ). Assume
fX(t) > 0 and fY (t) > 0 for all t ∈ R. We define the privacy loss function of fX over fY as
LX/Y (t) = log fX(t)
fY (t)
.
The following gives the definition of the privacy loss distribution via its density function.
We note that the assumptions on differentiability and bijectivity of the privacy loss function
hold for the subsampled Gaussian mechanism which is considered in Sec. 6.
Definition 4. Let the assumptions of Def. A.3 hold and suppose LX/Y : R → D, D ⊂ R
is a continuously differentiable bijective function. The privacy loss distribution (PLD) of
M(X) overM(Y ) is defined to be a random variable which has the density function
ωX/Y (s) =
{
fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds , s ∈ LX/Y (R),
0, else.
For the discrete valued versions of the following result, see [17, Lemmas 5 and 10].
Lemma 5. Assume (ε,∞) ⊂ LX/Y (R). M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for
δ(ε) = max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)},
where
δX/Y (ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)ωX/Y (s) ds,
and similarly for δY/X(ε).
The PLD formalism is essentially based on Lemma A.2 which states that the mechanism
M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP with
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
.
The integral representation of Lemma A.4 is then obtained by change of variables. Denoting
s = LX/Y (t), it clearly holds that fY (t) = e−sfX(t) and
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0}
=
{
(1− eε−s)fX(t), if s > ε,
0, otherwise.
By change of variables t = L−1X/Y (s), we obtain the representation of Lemma A.4.
We get the tight privacy guarantee for compositions from a continuous counterpart of
[17, Thm. 1].
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Theorem 6. Consider k consecutive applications of a mechanism M. Let ε > 0. The
composition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by δ(ε) = max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)}, where
δX/Y (ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s) (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y ) (s) ds,
where ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y denotes the k-fold convolution of ωX/Y (a similar formula holds for
δY/X(ε)).
4 The discrete Fourier transform
The discrete Fourier transform F and its inverse F−1 are linear operators Cn → Cn that
decompose a complex vector into a Fourier series, or reconstruct it from its Fourier series.
Suppose x = (x0, . . . , xn−1), w = (w0, . . . , wn−1) ∈ Rn. Then, F and F−1 are defined as [20]
(Fx)k =
∑n−1
j=0
xje
−i2pikj/n,
(F−1w)k = 1
n
∑n−1
j=0
wje
i2pikj/n.
Evaluating Fx and F−1w takes O(N2) operations, however evaluation via the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) [8] reduces the computational cost to O(N logN).
The convolution theorem [19] states that for periodic discrete convolutions it holds that∑n−1
i=0
viwk−i = F−1(Fv Fw), (4.1)
where  denotes the elementwise product of vectors and the summation indices are modulo
n.
5 Description of the method
We next describe the numerical method for computing tight DP-guarantees for continuous
one dimensional distributions.
5.1 Truncation of convolutions
We first approximate the convolutions on a truncated interval [−L,L] as
(ω ∗ ω)(x) ≈
∫ L
−L
ω(t)ω(x− t) dt =: (ω ~ ω)(x).
To obtain periodic convolutions for the discrete Fourier transform we need to periodise ω.
Let ω˜ be a 2L-periodic extension of ω such that ω˜(t + n2L) = ω(t) for all t ∈ [−L,L) and
n ∈ Z. We further approximate∫ L
−L
ω(t)ω(x− t) dt ≈
∫ L
−L
ω˜(t)ω˜(x− t) dt. (5.1)
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5.2 Discretisation of convolutions
Divide the interval [−L,L] on n equidistant points x0, . . . , xn−1 such that
xi = −L+ i∆x, where ∆x = 2L/n.
Consider the vectors
ω =
 ω0...
ωn−1
 and ω˜ =
 ω˜0...
ω˜n−1
 ,
where
ωi = ω(−L+ i∆x) and ω˜i = ω˜(i∆x).
Assuming n is even, from the periodicity it follows that
ω˜ = Dω, where D =
[
0 In/2
In/2 0
]
.
We approximate (5.1) using a Riemann sum and the convolution theorem (4.1) as
(ω˜ ~ ω˜)(i∆x) =
∫ L
−L
ω˜(t)ω˜(i∆x− t) dt
≈∆x
∑n−1
`=0
ω˜` ω˜i−` (indices modulo n)
=∆x
[F−1(F(ω˜)F(ω˜))]
i
.
Discretisation of k-fold truncated convolutions leads to k-fold discrete convolutions and to
the approximation
(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(−L+ i∆x)
≈ (∆x)k−1 [DF−1(F(ω˜)k)]
i
= (∆x)−1
[
DF−1(F(Dω∆x)k)]
i
,
where k denotes kth elementwise power of vectors.
5.3 Approximation of the δ(ε)-integral
Finally, using the discretised convolutions we approximate the integral formula for the exact
δ-value. Denote the discrete convolution vector
Ck = (∆x)−1
[
DF−1(F(Dω∆x)k)]
and the starting point of the discrete sum
`ε = min{` ∈ Z : −L+ `∆x > ε}.
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Using the vector Ck =
[
Ck0 . . . C
k
n−1
]T , we approximate the integral formula given in
Thm. 6 as a Riemann sum:
δ(ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds
≈ ∆x
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x))Ck` . (5.2)
We call this method the Fourier Accountant (FA) and describe it in the pseudocode of
Algorithm 1. We give in Sec. 7 error estimates to determine the parameters L and n such
that the error caused by approximations is below a desired level.
Algorithm 1 Fourier Accountant algorithm
Input: privacy loss distribution ω, number of compositions k, truncation parameter L, number
of discretisation points n.
Evaluate the discrete distribution values
ωi = ω(−L+ i∆x), i = 0, . . . , n− 1, ∆x = 2Ln .
Set
ω =
 ω0...
ωn−1
 .
Evaluate
Ck = (∆x)−1
[
DF−1(F(Dω∆x)k)] ,
`ε = min{` ∈ Z : −L+ `∆x > ε}.
Evaluate the approximation
δ(ε) ≈ ∆x
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x))Ck` .
5.4 Computing ε(δ) using Newton’s method
In order to get the function ε(δ), we compute the inverse of δ(ε) using Newton’s method.
From (5.2) it follows that (see Lemma D.1 of Appendix)
δ′(ε) = −
∫ ∞
ε
eε−s(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds. (5.3)
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Thus, in order to find ε such that δ(ε) = δ¯, we apply Newton’s method [20] to the function
δ(ε)− δ¯ which gives the iteration
ε`+1 = ε` − δ(ε`)− δ¯
δ′(ε`)
.
Evaluating δ′(ε) for different values of ε is cheap using the formula (5.3) and an approximation
analogous to (5.2). As is common practice, we use as a stopping criterion
∣∣δ(ε`)− δ¯∣∣ ≤ τ
for some prescribed tolerance parameter τ . The iteration was found to converge in all
experiments with an initial value ε0 = 0.
5.5 Approximation for varying mechanisms
Our approach also allows computing privacy cost of a composite mechanismM1 ◦ . . . ◦Mk,
where the PLDs of the mechanisms Mi vary. This is needed for example when accounting
the privacy loss of Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics iterations [23], where decreasing
the step size increases σ.
In this case the function δ(ε) is given by Thm. A.7 of Appendix by an integral formula
of the form
δ(ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω1 ∗ . . . ∗ ωk)(s) ds,
where ωi’s are PLD distributions determined by the mechanismsMi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Denoting C = (∆x)−1
[
DF−1(F1  . . . Fk)], where Fi = F(Dωi∆x) and ωi’s are
obtained from discretisations of ωi’s (as in Sec. 5.2), then δ(ε) can be approximated as in
(5.2).
6 Subsampled Gaussian mechanism
The main motivation for this work comes from privacy accounting of the subsampled Gaus-
sian mechanism which gives privacy bounds for DP-SGD (see e.g. [2]). In the appendix,
we show that the worst case privacy analysis of DP-SGD can be carried out by analysis of
one dimensional probability distributions. We derive the privacy loss distributions for three
different subsampling methods: Poisson subsampling with both ∼R- and ∼S-neighbouring
relations, sampling without replacement with ∼S-neighbouring relation and sampling with
replacement with ∼S-neighbouring relation. We note the following related works. In [3] RDP
bounds are considered for these three subsampling methods, in [22] improved RDP bounds
were given for the case of sampling without replacement and in [24] tight RDP bounds were
given for the case of Poisson subsampling.
6.1 Poisson subsampling for (ε, δ,∼R)-DP
We start with the Poisson subsampling method, where each member of the dataset is included
in the stochastic gradient minibatch with probability q. This method is also used in the
moments accountant [2], and also considered in [13] and [22]. As we show in Appendix, the
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(ε, δ,∼R)-DP analysis of the Poisson subsampling is equivalent to considering the following
one dimensional distributions:
fX(t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) =
1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 .
Here σ2 denotes the variance of the additive Gaussian noise. Using Definition A.3, the
privacy loss function is given by
LX/Y (t) = log
q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 +(1−q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
= log
(
q e
2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
)
.
Now LX/Y (R) = (log(1− q),∞) and LX/Y is again a strictly increasing continuously differ-
entiable bijective function in the whole R. Straightforward calculation shows that
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2 log
es − (1− q)
q
+
1
2
.
Moreover,
d
d s
L−1X/Y (s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) .
The privacy loss distribution ωX/Y is determined by the density function given in Defini-
tion A.5. Lemma A.9 and its corollary explain the observation that generally δX/Y > δY/X .
6.2 Sampling without replacement for (ε, δ,∼S)-DP
We next consider the ∼S-neighbouring relation and sampling without replacement. In this
case the batch size m is fixed and each member of the dataset contributes at most once for
each minibatch. Here q = m/n, where n denotes the total number of data samples. Without
loss of generality we consider here the density functions
fX(t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t+1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 .
The privacy loss function is now given by
LX/Y (t) = log
(
q e
2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
q e
−2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
)
.
We see that LX/Y (R) = R and again that LX/Y is a strictly increasing continuously differ-
entiable function. With a straightforward calculation we find that
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2 log
( 1
2c
(− (1− q)(1− es) +√(1− q)2(1− es)2 + 4c2es)),
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where c = q e−
1
2σ2 .
Using Lemma A.9 and the property fY (−t) = fX(t), we see that δ = δY/X = δX/Y .
We remark that in (ε, δ,∼S)-DP, the Poisson subsampling with the sampling parameter
γ is equivalent to the case of the sampling without replacement with q = γ, as in both cases
the differing element is included in the minibatch with probability γ.
6.3 Sampling with replacement
Consider next the sampling with replacement and the ∼S-neighbouring relation. Again the
batch size is fixed, however this time each element of the minibatch is drawn from the dataset
with probability q. Thus the number of contributions of each member of the dataset is not
limited. Then `, the number of times the differing sample x′ is in the batch, is binomially
distributed, i.e., ` ∼ Binomial(1/n,m), where m denotes the batch size and n the total
number of data samples.
Without loss of generality, we consider here the density functions
fX(t) =
1√
2piσ2
m∑
`=0
(
1
n
)`(
1− 1
n
)m−`(
m
`
)
e
−(t−`)2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) =
1√
2piσ2
m∑
`=0
(
1
n
)`(
1− 1
n
)m−`(
m
`
)
e
−(t+`)2
2σ2 .
The privacy loss function is then given by
LX/Y (t) = log
( ∑m
`=0 c`x
`∑m
`=0 c`x
−`
)
,
where
c` =
(
1
n
)`(
1− 1
n
)m−`(
m
`
)
e
−`2
2σ2 , x = e
t
σ2 .
Since c` > 0 for all ` = 1, . . . ,m, clearly
∑m
`=0 c`x
` is strictly increasing as a function of t
and
∑m
`=0 c`x
−` is strictly decreasing. Moreover, we see that∑m
`=0 c`x
`∑m
`=0 c`x
−` → 0 as t→ −∞
and ∑m
`=0 c`x
`∑m
`=0 c`x
−` →∞ as t→∞.
Thus, LX/Y (R) = R and LX/Y (t) is a strictly increasing continuously differentiable function
in its domain. To find L−1X/Y (s) one needs to solve LX/Y (t) = s, i.e., one needs to find the
single positive real root of a polynomial of order 2m. As in the case of subsampling without
replacement, here δ = δY/X = δX/Y .
9
7 Error estimates
We give error estimates for the Poisson subsampling method with the neighbouring relation
∼R. Thus, in this section ω denotes the PLD density function defined in Sec. 6.1. The
estimates are determined by the parameters L and n, the truncation interval radius and the
number of discretisation points, respectively.
The total error consists of (see Thm. C.1 in Appendix)
1. The errors arising from the truncation of the convolution integrals and periodisation.
2. The error from neglecting the tail integral∫ ∞
L
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds. (7.1)
3. The numerical errors in the approximation of the convolutions (ω ∗k ω) and in the
Riemann sum approximation (5.2).
We obtain bounds for the first two sources of error, i.e., for the tail integral (C.3) and
the periodisation error, using the Chernoff bound [21]
P[X ≥ t] = P[eλX ≥ eλt] ≤ E[e
λX ]
eλt
,
which holds for any random variable X and all λ > 0. Denoting also the PLD random
variable by ω, the moment generating function E[eλω] is related to the log of the moment
generating function of the privacy loss function L = LX/Y as follows. Define (see also [2])
α(λ) := log E
t∼fX(t)
[eλL(t)].
By the change of variable s = L(t) we have
E[eλω] =
∫ ∞
−∞
eλsω(s) ds
=
∫ ∞
log(1−q)
eλsfX(L−1(s)) dL
−1(s)
ds
ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
eλL(t)fX(t) dt = eα(λ).
(7.2)
Using existing bounds for α(λ) given in [2] and [15], we bound E[eλω] and obtain the required
tail bounds.
7.1 Periodisation and truncation of convolutions
We have the following bound for the error arising from the periodisation and the truncation
of the convolution integrals. The proof is given in Appendix, Lemma C.6.
10
Lemma 7. Let 0 < q < 12 . Let ω be defined as in Sec. 6.1, and let L ≥ 1. Then, for all
x ∈ R, ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ L
ε
(ω ∗k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(x) dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Lkσe− (σ2L+C)22σ2
+ eα(L/2)e−
L2
2 + 2
∑∞
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
,
where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12 .
For example, setting σ, q as in the example of Figure 1, and k = 2 · 104, the first term is
O(10−16) already for L = 4.0. The second term dominates the rest of the bound of Lemma 7
and it is much smaller than the tail bound (7.3) (eα(L/2) vs. ekα(L/2)). Therefore, this error
is much smaller than estimates for the tail integral (C.3) and it is neglected in the numerical
estimates.
7.2 Convolution tail bound
Let ω denote the PLD density function. Now, the tail of the integral representation for δ
(Thm. 6), with L > ε, can be bounded as∫ ∞
L
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds <
∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds.
We consider both upper bounds and estimates for the tail integral of convolutions.
7.2.1 Analytic tail bound
Using the Chernoff bound we derive an analytic bound for the tail integral of convolutions.
In a certain sense this is equivalent to finding bounds for the RDP parameters, since an
RDP bound gives a bound also for the moment generating function E[eλω] needed in the
Chernoff bound. The following result is derived from recent RDP results [15]. The proof
and an illustration of the result are given in Appendix.
Theorem 8. Suppose q ≤ 15 and σ ≥ 4. Let L be chosen such that λ = L/2 satisfies
1 <λ ≤ 1
2
σ2c− 2 log σ,
λ ≤
1
2σ
2c− log 5− 2 log σ
c+ log(qλ) + 1/(2σ2)
,
where c = log
(
1 + 1q(λ−1)
)
. Then, we have
∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds ≤
(
1 +
2q2(L2 + 1)
L
2
σ2
)k
e−
L2
2 .
In order to avoid the restriction on σ in Thm. 8, we consider an approximative bound.
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7.2.2 Tail bound estimate
We next derive an approximative tail bound using the α(λ)-bound given in [2]. Denote
Sk :=
∑k
i=1 ω
i, where ωi denotes the PLD random variable of the ith mechanism. Since ωi’s
are independent, E[eλSk ] =
∏k
i=1 E[eλω
i
] and the Chernoff bound shows that∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds = P[Sk ≥ L] ≤ ekα(λ)e−λL
for any λ > 0. We recall the result from [2, Lemma 3] which holds for the Poisson subsampling
method.
Lemma 9. Let σ ≥ 1 and q < 116σ , then for any positive integer λ ≤ σ2 ln 1qσ ,
α(λ) ≤ q
2λ(λ+ 1)
(1− q)σ2 +O(q
3λ3/σ3).
Suppose the conditions of Lemma 9 hold for λ = L/2. Substituting the bound of Lemma 9
to the Chernoff bound and neglecting the O(q3λ3/σ3)-term gives the approximative upper
bound ∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s)ds / exp
(
k
q2(L2 + 1)
L
2
(1− q)σ2
)
e−
L2
2 . (7.3)
For example, when q = 0.01 and σ = 2.0, the conditions of Lemma 9 hold for λ up to ≈ 9.5
(i.e. (7.3) holds for L up to ≈ 19). Figure 1 shows the convergence of the bound (7.3) in this
case.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
10-40
10-30
10-20
10-10
100
Figure 1: Convergence of the bound (7.3) for q = 0.01 and σ = 2.0 for different number of
compositions k.
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7.3 Discretisation errors
Derivation of discretisation error bounds can be carried out using the so called Euler–
Maclaurin formula (Sec. C.3 in Appendix). This requires bounds for higher order derivatives
of ω. As an illustrating example, consider the bound (recall ∆x = 2L/n)∣∣∣∣∣
∫ L
−L
ω(s) ds−∆x
∑n−1
`=0
ω(−L+ `∆x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆xω(L) + (∆x)212 maxt∈[−L,L] |ω′′(t)|
≤ ∆xσe−−(σ
2L+C)2
2σ2 +
(∆x)2
12
max
t∈[−L,L]
|ω′′(t)| ,
where C = σ2 log( 12q ) − 12 . By Lemma D.4, maxt |ω′′(t)| has an upper bound O(σ3/q3).
With bounds for higher order derivatives, tighter error bound could be obtained. In a similar
fashion, bounds for the errors for the approximation (5.2) could be derived. However, we
resort to numerical estimates.
7.3.1 Estimate for the discretisation error
Consider the error arising from the Riemann sum
In := ∆x
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x))Ck` .
As we show in Sec. C.3 of Appendix, it holds
En :=
∫ L
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds− In
=K∆x+O((∆x)2) = K
2L
n
+O
((2L
n
)2)
for some constant K independent of n. Therefore,
2(In − I2n) = En +O((∆x)2)
which leads us to use as an estimate
err(L, n) := 2 |In − I2n| (7.4)
for the numerical error En.
8 Experiments
In all experiments, we consider the Poisson subsampling with (ε, δ,∼R)-DP (Sec. 6.1).
We first illustrate the numerical convergence of FA for δ(ε) and the estimates (7.3) and
(7.4), when k = 104, q = 0.01, σ = 1.5 and ε = 1.0 (Tables 1 and 2). We emphasise that the
error estimates (7.3) and (7.4) represent the distance to the tight δ(ε)-value. This indicates
that the approximations converge to the actual tight δ(ε)-values.
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n FA err(L, n)
5 · 104 0.0491228786423 2.01 · 10−2
1 · 105 0.0496089458356 3.12 · 10−4
2 · 105 0.0496013846114 1.06 · 10−6
4 · 105 0.0496014103882 1.71 · 10−9
8 · 105 0.0496014103252 2.66 · 10−11
1.6 · 106 0.0496014103146 8.88 · 10−12
3.2 · 106 0.0496014103163 2.22 · 10−12
Table 1: Convergence of δ(ε)-approximation with respect to n (when L = 12) and the esti-
mate (7.4). The tail bound estimate (7.3) is O(10−24).
L FA estimate (7.3)
2.0 0.0422160172923 3.32 · 10−1
4.0 0.0496008932869 4.96 · 10−3
6.0 0.0496014103158 3.32 · 10−6
8.0 0.0496014103134 1.00 · 10−10
10.0 0.0496014103134 1.36 · 10−16
12.0 0.0496014103163 8.30 · 10−24
Table 2: Convergence of the δ(ε)-approximation with respect to L (when n = 3.2 · 106) and the
error estimate (7.3). The estimate err(L, n) = O(10−12).
We next compare the Fourier accountant method to the privacy accountant method
included in the Tensorflow library [1] which is the moments accountant method [2] (Figure 2).
We use q = 0.01 and σ ∈ {1.0, 2.0, 3.0}, for number of compositions k up to 104. We set the
parameters L = 12 and n = 5 · 106 for the approximation of the exact integral. Then, for
σ = 1.0, the tail integral error estimate (7.3) is at most O(10−13) and the estimate err(L, n)
is at most O(10−10). For σ = 2.0, 3.0 the error estimates are smaller.
We next compare FA to the RDP accountant method described in [24] (Figure 3). Al-
though the RDP accountant gives tight RDP-bounds, there is a small gap to the tight
(ε, δ,∼R)-DP.
As we see from Figures 2b and 3, the moments accountant and the RDP bound of [24]
do not capture the true ε-bound for small number of compositions k, whereas FA gives tight
bounds also in this case.
Figure 4 shows a comparison of FA to the Berry–Esseen theorem based bound given in [17,
Thm. 6]. The Berry–Esseen bound suffers from the error term which converges O(k−
1
2 ).
Lastly, we compare FA to the Privacy Buckets (PB) algorithm described in [13] (see Fig-
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Figure 2: Comparison of the Tensorflow moments accountant and the Fourier accountant. Here
q = 0.01.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the RDP bound for the Poisson subsampling [24] and FA. Here δ = 10−6,
q = 0.01.
ure 5). The additional ratio parameter of PB was tuned for the experiments. The algorithm
seems to suffer from some instabilities which is also mentioned in [13]. For larger σ and
smaller q PB gave bounds closer to that of FA, however the compute times were always
much bigger, as in experiments of Figure 5.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the Berry–Esseen bound and FA for (ε, δ,∼R)-DP. Here k = 5 · 104,
q = 0.01.
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Figure 5: Comparison of the Privacy Buckets algorithm (nB = number of buckets) and FA.
Legend contains compute times. Here k = 212, σ = 1.0, q = 0.02.
9 Conclusions
We have presented a novel approach for computing tight privacy bounds for DP. Although we
have focused on the subsampled Gaussian mechanism (with various subsampling strategies),
our method is applicable to any continuous mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Defi-
nition A.3. Using the existing RDP bounds we were able to give analytical bounds to some
central quantities in the error analysis. For the errors arising from the numerical integration,
we gave numerical estimates. As future work, it would be interesting to carry out a full error
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analysis for the discretisation error and also to implement the method on other mechanisms
than the subsampled Gaussian mechanism. Moreover, evaluating for compositions involving
both continuous and discrete valued mechanisms would also be an interesting objective.
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A Proofs for the results of Section 3
A.1 Integral representation for exact DP-guarantees
Throughout this section we denote for neighbouring datasets X and Y the density function
ofM(X) with fX(t) and the density function ofM(Y ) with fY (t).
Definition A.1. A randomised algorithmM with an output of continuous one dimensional
distributions satisfies (ε, δ)-DP if for every set S ⊂ R and every neighbouring datasets X
and Y ∫
S
fX(t) dt ≤ eε
∫
S
fY (t) dt+ δ and
∫
S
fY (t) dt ≤ eε
∫
S
fX(t) dt+ δ.
We callM tightly (ε, δ)-DP, if there does not exist δ′ < δ such thatM is (ε, δ′)-DP.
The following auxiliary lemma is needed to obtain the representation given by Lemma
A.4 (see [13, Lemma 1] for the discrete valued version of the result).
Lemma A.2. M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP with
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
. (A.1)
Proof. Assume M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP. Then, for every set S ⊂ R and every neighbouring
datasets X and Y ,∫
S
fX(t)− eεfY (t) dt ≤
∫
S
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt
≤
∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt.
We get an analogous bound for
∫
S
fY (t)− eεfX(t) dt. By Definition A.1,
δ ≤ max
{∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt,
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt
}
.
To show that the above inequality is tight, consider the set
S = {t ∈ R : fX(t) ≥ eεfY (t)}.
Then, ∫
S
fX(t)− eεfY (t) dt =
∫
S
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt
=
∫
R
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} dt.
(A.2)
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Next, consider the set
S = {t ∈ R : fY (t) ≥ eεfX(t)}.
Similarly, ∫
S
fY (t)− eεfX(t) dt =
∫
R
max{fY (t)− eεfX(t), 0} dt. (A.3)
From (A.2) and (A.3) it follows that there exists a set S ⊂ R such that either∫
S
fX(t) dt = e
ε
∫
S
fY (t) dt+ δ or
∫
S
fY (t) dt = e
ε
∫
S
fX(t) dt+ δ
for δ given by (A.1). This shows that δ given by (A.1) is tight.
The next lemma gives an integral representation for the right hand side of (A.1) involving
the distribution function of the PLD (see also Lemma 5 of [17]). First we need the following
definition.
Definition A.3. LetM : XN → R be a randomised mechanism and let X ∼ Y . Let fX(t)
denote the density function of M(X) and fY (t) the density function of M(Y ). Assume
fX(t) > 0 and fY (t) > 0 for all t ∈ R. We define the privacy loss function of fX over fY as
LX/Y (t) = log fX(t)
fY (t)
.
Lemma A.4. LetM be defined as above. M is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)},
where
δX/Y (ε) =
∫
LX/Y (R)∩ [ε,∞)
(1− eε−s)fX
(
L−1X/Y (s)
) dL−1X/Y (s)
ds
ds,
δY/X(ε) =
∫
LY/X(R)∩ [ε,∞)
(1− eε−s)fY
(
L−1Y/X(s)
) dL−1Y/X(s)
ds
ds.
Proof. Consider the privacy loss function LX/Y (t) = log fX(t)fY (t) . Denote s = LX/Y (t). Then,
it clearly holds fY (t) = e−sfX(t) and
max{fX(t)− eεfY (t), 0} = max{0, (1− eε−s)fX(t)}
=
{
(1− eε−s)fX(t), if s > ε,
0, otherwise.
(A.4)
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Consider next the integral
∫
R max{0, fX(t)−eεfY (t)} dt. By making the change of variables
t = L−1X/Y (s) and using (A.4), we see that∫
R
max{0, fX(t)− eεfY (t)} dt =
∫
R
max{0, (1− eε−s)fX(t)} dt
=
∫
LX/Y (R)
max
{
0,
(
1− eε−s)fX(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds
}
ds
=
∫
LX/Y (R)∩ [ε,∞)
(1− eε−s)fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds ds,
since
dL−1
X/Y
(s)
ds ≥ 0 for all s ∈ LX/Y (R). Analogously, we see that∫
R
max{0, fY (t)− eεfX(t)} dt =
∫
LY/X(R)∩ [ε,∞)
(1− eε−s)fY
(L−1Y/X(s)) dL−1Y/X(s)ds ds.
The claim follows then from Lemma A.2.
Definition A.5. Let the assumptions of Definition A.3 of the main text hold and suppose
LX/Y : R → D, D ⊂ R is a continuously differentiable bijective function. The privacy loss
distribution (PLD) of M(X) over M(Y ) is defined to be a random variable which has the
density function
ωX/Y (s) =
{
fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds , s ∈ LX/Y (R),
0, else.
We directly get from Lemma A.4 the following representation.
Corollary A.6. A randomised algorithmM with an output of continuous one dimensional
distributions is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)}, (A.5)
where
δX/Y (ε) =
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωX/Y (s) ds, δY/X(ε) =
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)ωY/X(s) ds.
A.2 Privacy loss distribution of compositions
In order to use the representation given by Corollary A.6 for a composition of several mech-
anisms, we need to be able to evaluate the privacy loss distribution for compositions. This
is given in the following theorem which is a continuous version of [17, Thm. 1].
21
Theorem A.7. Let X,Y be adjacent datasets and let fX(t) denote the density function of
M(X), fY (t) that ofM(Y ), fX′(t) that ofM′(X) and fY ′(t) that ofM′(Y ). Consider the
PLD ωcX/Y of the composition ofM andM′ (eitherM◦M′ orM′ ◦M). Denote by ωX/Y
the PLD ofM(X) overM(Y ) and by ωX′/Y ′ the PLD ofM′(X) overM′(Y ). The density
function of ωcX/Y is given by
ωcX/Y (s) =
∞∫
−∞
ωX/Y (t)ωX′/Y ′(s− t) dt.
Proof. We first show that the privacy loss function of a composition is a sum of privacy loss
functions. Let LcX/Y denote the privacy loss function of the composition mechanism. Then,
LcX/Y (t1, t2) = log
(
fX,X′(t1, t2)
fY,Y ′(t1, t2)
)
= log
(
fX(t1)fX′(t2)
fY (t1)fY ′(t2)
)
= log
(
fX(t1))
fY (t1))
)
+ log
(
fX′(t2)
fY ′(t2)
)
=LX/Y (t1) + LX′/Y ′(t2).
(A.6)
Let S ∈ R be a measurable set. By using the property (A.6) and by change of variables we
see that
ωCX/Y (S) =
∫∫
{(t1,t2)∈R2 :Lc(t1,t2)∈S}
fX,X′(t1, t2) dt1 dt2
=
∫∫
{(t1,t2)∈R2 :LX/Y (t1)+LX′/Y ′ (t2)∈S}
fX(t1)fX′(t2) dt1 dt2
=
∫∫
{s1+s2 ∈S}∩ {LX/Y (R)+LX′/Y ′ (R)}
fX
(L−1X/Y (s1)) dL−1X/Y (s1)ds ·
fX′
(L−1X′/Y ′(s2)) dL−1X′/Y ′(s2)ds ds1 ds2
=
∫∫
{s1+s2 ∈S}
ωX/Y (s1)ωX′/Y ′(s2) ds1 ds2
=
∫
S
 ∞∫
−∞
ωX/Y (s1)ωX′/Y ′(t− y1) ds1
 dt.
From Corollary A.6 and Theorem A.7 we get the following integral formula for δ(ε).
22
Corollary A.8. Consider k consecutive applications of a mechanism M. Let ε > 0. The
composition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by
δ(ε) = max
X∼Y
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X(ε)},
where
δX/Y (ε) =
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s) (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y ) (s) ds,
where (ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y )(s) denotes the density function obtained by convolving ωX/Y by itself
k times (an analogous formula holds for δY/X(ε)).
We also give the following result for the relation between ωX/Y and ωY/X . This result
can be used to determine which the value max{δX/Y , δY/X}. This result can be seen as a
continuous version of Lemma 2 in [17].
Lemma A.9. Let the privacy loss functions LX/Y and LY/X and the privacy loss distribu-
tions ωX/Y and ωY/X . Then, it holds LY/X(R) = { t ∈ R : −t ∈ LX/Y (R)} and for all
y ∈ LX/Y (R):
ωX/Y (s) = e
sωY/X(−s).
Proof. From the definition it follows that
LX/Y (t) = −LY/X(t),
and therefore also
L−1Y/X(s) = L−1X/Y (−s) (A.7)
for all y ∈ LX/Y (R). Let y ∈ LX/Y (R). Then,
ωX/Y (s) = fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds
= fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) 1L′X/Y (L−1X/Y (s)) .
(A.8)
We notice that
fX(t)
L′X/Y (t)
=
fX(t)
f ′X(t)
fX(t)
− f ′Y (t)fY (t)
=
fX(t)
2fY (t)
f ′X(t)fY (t)− f ′Y (t)fX(t)
=
fX(t)
fY (t)
fX(t)fY (t)
2
f ′X(t)fY (t)− f ′Y (t)fX(t)
= eLX/Y (t)
fY (t)
L′Y/X(t)
and the claim follows using (A.8) and (A.7).
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One easily verifies the following corollary of Lemma A.9.
Corollary A.10. For the convolutions it holds(
ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y
)
(s) = es
(
ωY/X ∗k ωY/X
)
(−s).
B Tight privacy bounds for the Gaussian mechanism via
one dimensional distributions
In this Section we show that the tight bounds of DP-SGD can be carried out by analysis of
one dimensional mixture distributions. This equivalence has also been used in [2, Proof of
Lemma 3]. We consider three different subsampling methods: sampling without replacement,
sampling with replament and Poisson subsampling (see [3] for further details).
In the next subsection we also rigorously show that tight privacy bounds for DP-SGD
can be obtained from the analysis of one dimensional distributions.
B.1 Equivalence of the privacy bounds between the multidimen-
sional and
one dimensional mechanisms
As an example, we consider the Poisson subsampling. In this case each member of the dataset
is included in the stochastic gradient minibatch with probability q. This means that each
data element can appear at most once in the sample. The basic mechanism M is then of
the form
M(X) =
∑
x∈B
f(x) +N (0, σ2Id),
where B is a randomly drawn subset of {x1, . . . , xN} and ‖f(x)‖2 ≤ 1 for all x ∈ B.
Consider the case of remove/add relation ∼R and let X and Y be neighbouring datasets.
Consider first the case q = 1, i.e., |B| = N . The condition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy states
that for every measurable set S ⊂ Rd and every neighbouring X and Y :
P(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(M(Y ) ∈ S) + δ. (B.1)
SupposeX = Y ∪{x′} and assume ‖f(x′)‖2 = 1. and we easily see that this is then equivalent
to the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P
(N (f(x)′, σ2Id) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(N (0, σ2Id) ∈ S)+ δ. (B.2)
Let U ∈ Rd×d be a unitary matrix such that
Uf(x′) =

1
0
...
0
 =: e1.
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This means that U is of the form U =
[
f(x′) U˜
]
, where U˜ can be taken as any d× (d− 1)
matrix with orthonormal columns such that U˜T f(x′) = 0.
Due to the unitarity of U , the condition (B.2) is equivalent to the condition that for every
measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P
(
UN (f(x′), σ2Id) ∈ US
) ≤ eεP(UN (0, σ2Id) ∈ US)+ δ. (B.3)
Furthermore, due to the unitarity of U , UN (0, σ2Id) ∼ N (0, σ2Id) and we see that (B.3) is
equivalent to the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P
(N (e1, σ2Id) ∈ US) ≤ eεP(N (0, σ2Id) ∈ US)+ δ, (B.4)
where US = {Ux : x ∈ S}. Then, we see that the condition (B.3) is equivalent to the
condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ R:
P
(N (1, σ2) ∈ S) ≤ eεP(N (0, σ2) ∈ S)+ δ. (B.5)
Thus, if X and Y are given as above, finding the parameters ε and δ that satisfy (B.1)
amounts to finding values of ε and δ that satisfy (B.5).
When q < 1, we see that f(x′) is in B with a probability q. Reasoning as above, we
arrive at the the condition that for every measurable set S ⊂ Rd:
P
(
qN (f(x′), σ2Id) + (1− q)N (0, σ2Id) ∈ S
) ≤ eεP(N (0, σ2Id) ∈ S)+ δ,
where qN (f(x′), σ2Id) + (1 − q)N (0, σ2Id) denotes a mixture distribution. Similarly, this
leads to considering the one dimensional neighbouring distributions
fX := qN (1, σ2) + (1− q)N (0, σ2) and fY := N (0, σ2).
In order the condition (B.1) holds for all X ∼R Y , then it has to hold that for every
measurable set S ⊂ R both
P
(
fX ∈ S
) ≤ eεP(fY ∈ S)+ δ and P(fY ∈ S) ≤ eεP(fX ∈ S)+ δ.
With an analogous reasoning, we see that in the case of substitution relation ∼S the
worst case is obtained by considering the neighbouring distributions
qN (1, σ2) + (1− q)N (0, σ2)
and
qN (−1, σ2) + (1− q)N (0, σ2).
Finally, we note that the case ‖f(x′)‖2 < 1 would lead to neighbouring distributions
fX and fY that are closer to each other than in the case ‖f(x′)‖2 = 1. This would give
tighter (ε, δ)-values, i.e., ‖f(x′)‖2 = 1 gives the worst case. This could be shown rigorously
by scaling the parameter σ and considering the analysis below.
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B.2 Poisson subsampling
B.2.1 Neighbouring relation with remove/add
As shown above, for the analysis in case of Poisson subsampling it is sufficient to consider
the density functions (see also [22] and [13])
fX(t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) =
1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 .
(B.6)
The privacy loss function LX/Y (t) is then given by
LX/Y (t) = log
q 1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
= log
(
q e
2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
)
.
We see that LX/Y (R) = (log(1− q),∞) and that LX/Y is a strictly increasing continuously
differentiable function in the whole R. Straightforward calculation shows that
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2 log
es − (1− q)
q
+
1
2
and
d
d s
L−1X/Y (s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) .
The privacy loss distribution ωX/Y is then given by the density function
d ωX/Y
d s
(s) =
{
fX(L−1X/Y (s)) dd sL−1X/Y (s), if s > log(1− q),
0, else.
The privacy loss distribution dωX/Yds has its mass mostly on the positive real axis (equals
zero for y ≤ log(1 − q)) and so do the the convolutions dωX/Yds ∗k
dωX/Y
ds . Therefore, by
Lemma A.9 and its corollary, we see that dωY/Xds has its mass mostly on the negative real
axis (equals zero for y ≥ |log(1− q)|). Thus the representation (A.5) supports the numerical
observation that generally δ = δX/Y .
B.3 Sampling without replacement and ∼S-neighouring relation
Denote by m the batch size (fixed) and q = m/N . In case of sampling without replacement
and (ε, δ,∼S)-DP, the differing element is in the minibatch with a probability q, and without
loss of generality, we may again consider the density functions
fX(t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) = q
1√
2piσ2
e
−(t+1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 .
(B.7)
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The privacy loss function is then given by
LX/Y (t) = log
q 1√2piσ2 e −(t−1)
2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
q 1√
2piσ2
e
−(t+1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
 = log( q e 2t−12σ2 + (1− q)
q e
−2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
)
.
Now LX/Y (R) = R and LX/Y is again a strictly increasing continuously differentiable func-
tion in the whole R. Denote
x = e
t
σ2 and c = qe−
1
2σ2 .
Then, solving LX/Y (t) = s leads to the equation
cx+ (1− q)
cx−1 + (1− q) = e
s
⇐⇒ cx2 + (1− q)(1− es)x− ces = 0
x>0⇐⇒ x = −(1− q)(1− e
s) +
√
(1− q)2(1− es)2 + 4c2es
2c
.
We find that
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2 log
(
−(1− q)(1− es) +√(1− q)2(1− es)2 + 4c2es
2c
)
and
d
d s
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2
4c2es−2(1−q)2es(1−es)
2
√
4c2es+(1−q)2(1−es)2 + (1− q)e
s√
4c2es + (1− q)2(1− es)2 − (1− q)(1− es) .
In case of odd loss functions (fY (−t) = fX(t) and LX/Y (−t) = −LX/Y (t)) we have the
following:
dωX/Y
ds
(s) =
dωY/X
ds
(s).
This follows from using the oddity of LX/Y and Lemma A.9. Therefore, if fY (−t) = fX(t)
and LX/Y (−t) = −LX/Y (t), it holds δ = δY/X = δX/Y by the representation (A.5).
We remark that in (ε, δ,∼S)-DP, the Poisson subsampling with the sampling parameter
γ (i.e., each sample is in the batch with a probability γ) is equivalent to the case of the
sampling with replacement with q = γ, as in both cases the differing element is included in
the minibatch with probability γ.
B.4 Sampling with replacement and ∼S-neighouring relation
Consider next the sampling with replacement and the ∼S-neighouring relation. Then the
number of times the differing sample x′ is in the batch is binomially distributed, i.e., the
probability for being in the batch ` times is
(
1
n
)`(
1
n
)m−`(
m
`
)
, where m denotes the batch
size and n the total number of data samples.
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Then, without loss of generality, we may consider the density functions (m denotes the
batch size)
fX(t) =
1√
2piσ2
m∑
`=0
q`(1− q)m−`
(
m
`
)
e
−(t−`)2
2σ2 ,
fY (t) =
1√
2piσ2
m∑
`=0
q`(1− q)m−`
(
m
`
)
e
−(t+`)2
2σ2 ,
(B.8)
where q = 1/n. The privacy loss function is then given by
LX/Y (t) = log

m∑`
=0
q`(1− q)m−`(m` ) e −(t−`)22σ2
m∑`
=0
q`(1− q)m−`(m` ) e −(t+`)22σ2
 = log

m∑`
=0
c`x
`
m∑`
=0
c`x−`
 ,
where
c` = q
`(1− q)m−`
(
m
`
)
e
−`2
2σ2 and x = e
t
σ2 . (B.9)
Since c` > 0 for all ` = 1, . . . ,m, clearly
∑m
`=0 c`x
` is strictly increasing as a function of t
and
∑m
`=0 c`x
−` is strictly decreasing. Moreover, we see that
∑m
`=0 c`x
`∑m
`=0 c`x
−` → 0 as t→ −∞ and
∑m
`=0 c`x
`∑m
`=0 c`x
−` →∞ as t→∞.
Thus, LX/Y (R) = R and LX/Y (t) is a strictly increasing continuously differentiable function
in the whole R. To find L−1X/Y (s) one needs to solve LX/Y (t) = s, i.e., one needs to find the
single real root of a polynomial of order 2m.
To find L−1X/Y (s), i.e. to solve LX/Y (t) = s for a given y, one may use e.g. Newton’s
method.
C Error estimates
For the error analysis we consider the Poisson subsampling with (ε, δ,∼R)-DP, i.e., we con-
sider the PLD density function (Sec. B.2.1)
ω(s) =
{
f(g(s))g′(s), if s > log(1− q),
0, otherwise,
(C.1)
where
f(t) =
1√
2piσ2
[qe
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q)e− t
2
2σ2 ],
g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
.
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Theorem C.1. Let the vector Ck be defined as in Sec. 5.3. Total error of the approxima-
tion (determined by the truncation parameter L and the discretisation parameter n) can be
bounded by three terms as follows:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck`
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ I1(L) + I2(L) + I3(L, n),
where
I1(L) =
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds,
I2(L) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(s)− (ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
I3(L, n) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck`
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. By adding and subtracting terms and using the triangle inequality, we get∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck`
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck`
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(s)− (ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck`
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(C.2)
We consider next separately each of the three terms on the right hand side of (C.2).
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C.1 Tail bounds for the convolved PLDs
The first term on the right hand side of (C.2) is bounded by the tail of the convolved PLDs:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds. (C.3)
In this Section we show how to use existing Rényi differential privacy (RDP) results to bound
the tail (C.3).
The Chernoff bound (see e.g. [21]) states that for any random variable X and for all
λ > 0 it holds
P[X ≥ t] = P[eλX ≥ eλt] ≤ E[e
λX ]
eλt
. (C.4)
From the RDP bounds given in [15] we obtain the following bound for the moment generating
function E[eλω].
Lemma C.2. Suppose q ≤ 15 and σ ≥ 4. Suppose λ satisfies
1 <λ ≤ 1
2
σ2c− 2 log σ,
λ ≤
1
2σ
2c− log 5− 2 log σ
c+ log(qλ) + 1/(2σ2)
,
where c = log
(
1 + 1q(λ−1)
)
. Then,
E[eλω] ≤ 1 + 2q
2(λ+ 1)λ
σ2
.
Proof. Making change of variables y = L(t) (recall: L(R) = (log(1 − q),∞) and L(t) is
a strictly increasing differentiable function), we see a connection to the Rényi differential
privacy:
E[eλω] =
∞∫
log(1−q)
eλsω(s) ds
=
∞∫
−∞
eλL(t)fX(t) dt
=
∞∫
−∞
(
fX(t)
fY (t)
)λ
fX(t) dt
=
∞∫
−∞
(
fX(t)
fY (t)
)λ+1
fY (t) dt.
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Here fX(t) = qµ1(t) + (1 − q)µ0(t), where µ0(t) = 1√2piσ2 e
−t2
2σ2 and µ1(t) = 1√2piσ2 e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 ,
and fY (t) = µ0(t). Therefore
E[eλω] =
∞∫
−∞
(
fX(t)
fY (t)
)λ+1
fY (t) dt =
∞∫
−∞
(
(1− q) + qµ1(t)
µ0(t)
)λ+1
µ0(t) dt. (C.5)
From the proof of [15, Thm. 11] we get a bound for (C.5) which shows the claim.
Theorem C.3. Let the assumptions on σ and q of Lemma C.2 hold. Assume ωi, i = 1, . . . , k
are independent PLDs of the form (C.1) determined by σ and q. Denote Sk :=
∑k
i=1 ωi.
Then, it holds
P(Sk ≥ L) ≤
(
1 +
2q2(λ+ 1)λ
σ2
)k
e−Lλ
for all λ that satisfy the assumptions of Lemma C.2.
Proof. Since ωi’s are independent, we have by Lemma C.2,
E[eλSk ] =
k∏
i=1
E[eλωi ] ≤
(
1 +
2q2(λ+ 1)λ
σ2
)k
.
Using the Chernoff bound, we find that
P(Sk ≥ L) ≤
(
1 +
2q2(λ+ 1)λ
σ2
)k
e−Lλ.
For all λ that satisfy the assumptions of Lemma C.2.
The parameter λ in Theorem C.3 can be chosen freely as long as it satisfies the conditions
of Lemma C.2. The λ that minimises the function λ2e−Lλ is given by λ = L2 . This choice
leads to the following bound.
Corollary C.4. Let L be chosen such that λ = L/2 satisfies the assumptions of Lemma C.2.
Then, we have the following bound:
P(Sk ≥ L) ≤
(
1 +
2q2(L2 + 1)
L
2
σ2
)k
e−
L2
2 .
Notice that
P(Sk ≥ L) =
∞∫
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds.
Example. Set q = 0.01, σ = 4.0. We numerically observe that the conditions of Lemma
2 hold up to λ ≈ 14.3. Thus, Corollary 4 holds up to L ≈ 28.6. Figure 6 shows the
convergence of the bound with respect to L.
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Figure 6: Convergence of the bound given by Corollary 4.
C.2 Errors arising from truncation of the convolution integrals and
periodisation
We next bound the second term on the right hand side of (C.2), i.e. the term∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We easily see that this can be bounded as∣∣∣∣∣∣
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω ∗k ω)(s) ds−
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ∗k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(x)∣∣ dx
≤
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(x)∣∣ dx+ L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(x)∣∣ dx.
(C.6)
C.2.1 Truncation of the convolution integrals
We first bound ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω. We have the following pointwise bound.
Lemma C.5. Let σ > 0 and 0 < q < 12 . Let ω be defined as above, and let L ≥ 1. Then,
for all x ∈ R, ∣∣(ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω)(x)∣∣ ≤ kσe−−(σ2L+C)22σ2 ,
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where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12
Proof. By adding and subtracting, we may write
ω ∗k ω − ω ~k ω = ω ~ (ω ∗k−1 ω − ω ~k−1 ω) + ω ~ (ω ~k−1 ω)− ω ∗ (ω ~k−1 ω), (C.7)
where
ω ~ (ω ~k−1 ω)− ω ∗ (ω ~k−1 ω)(x)
=
L∫
−L
ω(t)(ω ~k−1 ω)(x− t) dt−
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)(ω ~k−1 ω)(x− t) dt
= −
∞∫
L
ω(t)(ω ~k−1 ω)(x− t) dt,
since ω(s) = 0 for all s < log(1 − q) and −L < log(1 − q). Using Lemma D.3 of Appendix,
we see that for all x,
∣∣(ω ~ (ω ~k−1 ω)− ω ∗ (ω ~k−1 ω))(x)∣∣ ≤ max
s≥L
ω(s)
∞∫
L
(ω ~k−1 ω)(x− t) dt
≤ max
s≥L
ω(s)
≤ σe−−(σ
2L+C)2
2σ2 .
(C.8)
Using again Lemma D.3, we see that for all x,
|(ω ∗ ω − ω ~ ω)(x)| =
∞∫
−∞
ω(t)ω(x− t) dt−
L∫
−L
ω(t)ω(x− t) dt
=
∞∫
L
ω(t)ω(x− t) dt
≤ max
s≥L
ω(s)
∞∫
L
ω(x− t) dt
≤ σe−−(σ
2L+C)2
2σ2 .
(C.9)
The claim follows from the recursion (C.7) and the bounds (C.8) and (C.9).
C.2.2 Error arising from the periodisation
We next bound the second term on the right hand side of (C.6). The bound is expressed in
terms of the the log of the moment generating function of the privacy loss function L = LX/Y
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(see also [2]) which is defined for all λ > 0 as
α(λ) := log E
t∼fX(t)
[eλL(t)].
As shown in equation (7.2) of the main text, α(λ) is related to the moment generating
function of the privacy loss distribution as
E[eλω] = eα(λ). (C.10)
Thus, using the Chernoff bound and (C.10), tail bounds involving ω can bounded in terms
of α(λ). Bounds for α(λ) in the case of Poisson subsampling with ∼R neighbouring relation
are given in [2] and [15].
Lemma C.6. Let ω be defined as above. Then,
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(x)∣∣ dx ≤ eα(L/2)e−L22 + 2 ∞∑
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
.
Proof. We see that
(ω˜ ~k ω˜ − ω ~k ω)(x)
=
L∫
−L
ω˜(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω˜(tk−1) ω˜(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
−
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)ω(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
=
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1) ω˜(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
−
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)ω(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
=
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)
(
ω˜(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti)− ω(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti)
)
dt1 . . . dtk−1,
(C.11)
since ω = ω˜ on the interval [−L,L].
Recall that ω˜ is the 2L-periodic function for which ω˜(t) = ω(t) for all t ∈ [−L,L].
Therefore
ω˜(t)− ω(t) =
∑
n∈Z\{0}
ω̂n(t)− r(t), (C.12)
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where
ω̂n(t) =
{
ω(t− 2nL), if t ∈ [(2n− 1)L, (2n+ 1)L]
0, else,
and
r(t) =
{
ω(t), if t ≥ L
0, else.
Thus, from (C.11) and (C.12) it follows that
(ω˜ ~k ω˜ − ω ~k ω)(x) = C1(x) + C2(x), (C.13)
where
C1(x) =
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)
∑
n∈Z\{0}
ω̂n(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
and
C2(x) =
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)r(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1.
We see that |C1(x)| can be bounded as
|C1(x)| =
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)
∑
n∈Z\{0}
ω̂n(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
=
∑
n∈Z\{0}
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1) ω̂n(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
≤
∑
n∈Z\{0}
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)ω(x− 2nL−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
≤
∑
n∈Z\{0}
∞∫
−∞
ω(t1) . . .
∞∫
−∞
ω(tk−1)ω(x− 2nL−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1
=
∑
n∈Z\{0}
(ω ∗k ω)(x− 2nL).
Next, consider the expression
L∫
ε
∑
n∈Z\{0}
(ω ∗k ω)(x− 2nL) dx =
∞∑
n=1
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(x− 2nL) dx+
∞∑
n=1
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(x+ 2nL) dx.
(C.14)
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Clearly, for the second term on the right hand side of (C.14),
∞∑
n=1
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(x+ 2nL) dx =
∞∑
n=1
L+2nL∫
ε+2nL
(ω ∗k ω)(x) dx
≤
∞∑
n=1
∞∫
ε+2nL
(ω ∗k ω)(x) dx
≤
∞∑
n=1
∞∫
2nL
(ω ∗k ω)(x) dx
≤
∞∑
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
,
(C.15)
where on the last step we use the Chernoff bound for each term with λ = nL.
In order to bound the second term on the right hand side of (C.14) we consider the
following. From the Chernoff bound we get
P(ω ≤ −L) = P(−ω ≥ L) ≤ E[e
−λω]
eλL
(C.16)
for all λ > 0.
Let us use again the notation of the proof of Lemma C.2, i.e., denote fX(t) = qµ1(t) +
(1 − q)µ0(t), where µ0(t) = 1√2piσ2 e
−t2
2σ2 and µ1(t) = 1√2piσ2 e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 , and fY (t) = µ0(t). By
change of variables s = LX/Y (t), we see that
E[e−λω] =
∞∫
−∞
e
−λ log fX (t)
fY (t) fX(t) dt =
∞∫
−∞
(
fY (t)
fX(t)
)λ
fX(t) dt. (C.17)
From [15, Corollary 7] it follows that for all λ ≥ 1,
∞∫
−∞
(
fY (t)
fX(t)
)λ
fX(t) dt ≤
∞∫
−∞
(
fX(t)
fY (t)
)λ
fY (t) dt =
∞∫
−∞
(
fX(t)
fY (t)
)λ−1
fX(t) dt = E[e (λ−1)ω].
(C.18)
I.e., from (C.17) and (C.18) we find that for any λ ≥ 1 it holds
E[e−λω] ≤ E[e (λ−1)ω] = eα(λ−1). (C.19)
Using the bounds (C.16) and (C.19) we get for the second term on the right hand side of
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(C.14):
∞∑
n=1
L∫
ε
(ω ∗k ω)(x− 2nL) dx =
∞∑
n=1
(1−2n)L∫
ε−2nL
(ω ∗k ω)(x) dx
≤
∞∑
n=1
−(2n−1)L∫
−∞
(ω ∗k ω)(x) dx
≤
∞∑
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
,
(C.20)
where on the last step we use the Chernoff bound for each term with λ = nL+1. Substituting
(C.15) and (C.20) into (C.14), we see that
L∫
ε
|C1(x)| dx ≤ 2
∞∑
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
. (C.21)
Moreover,
L∫
ε
|C2(x)| dx =
L∫
ε
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)r(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dt1 . . . dtk−1 dx
=
L∫
−L
ω(t1) . . .
L∫
−L
ω(tk−1)
L∫
ε
r(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dx dt1 . . . dtk−1.
(C.22)
Clearly, for the inner factor in the integrand it holds by the Chernoff bound (setting λ = L/2)
L∫
ε
r(x−
∑k−1
i=1
ti) dx ≤
∞∫
L
ω(t) dt ≤ eα(L/2)e−L
2
2 .
Thus, from (C.22) it follows that
L∫
ε
|C2(x)| dx ≤ eα(L/2)e−L
2
2 . (C.23)
Substituting (C.21) and (C.23) into (C.13), we get
L∫
ε
∣∣(ω ~k ω − ω˜ ~k ω˜)(x)∣∣ dx ≤ eα(L/2)e−L22 + 2 ∞∑
n=1
ekα(nL)e−2(nL)
2
.
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C.3 Error expansion with respect to ∆x
The purpose of this section is to show that the following assumption used in the main text
holds (recall ∆x = 2L/n):
There exists a constant K independent of n such that
L∫
ε
(1− eε−s)(ω˜ ~k ω˜)(s) ds−∆x
n−1∑
`=0
(
1− eε−(`∆x))Ck` = K∆x+O((∆x)2). (C.24)
We motivate this assumption using the Euler–Maclaurin summation formula which gives
the following expansion for the error of the Riemann sum formula (see [20, Ch. 3.3]).
Lemma C.7 (Euler–Maclaurin formula). Let f ∈ C2m+2[a, b]. Let N ∈ N+ and denote
∆x = (b− a)/N . Then,
∆x
N−1∑
i=0
f(a+ i∆x)−
∫ b
a
f(x) dx = ∆x
f(a)− f(b)
2
+
m∑
`=1
(∆x)2`
B2`
(2`)!
(
f (2`−1)(b)− f (2`−1)(a))
+ (∆x)2m+2
B2m+2
(2m+ 2)!
f (2m+2)(η), η ∈ [a, b],
where Bi is the ith Bernoulli number.
Consider the discrete convolution vector Ck as defined in Section 5. By definition (sum-
mations periodic, indices modulo n),
Cki = ∆x
n−1∑
j=0
ω˜(j∆x)Ck−1i−j , C
2
i = ∆x
n−1∑
j=0
ω˜(j∆x)ω˜(i∆x− j∆x),
If, instead, we consider the discrete convolutions
Ĉki = ∆x
n−1∑
j=0
ω(j∆x)Ck−1i−j , Ĉ
2
i = ∆x
n−1∑
j=0
ω(j∆x)ω(i∆x− j∆x),
then by the Euler–Maclaurin formula there clearly exist a constant K independent of n such
that
Ĉki − (ω ~k ω)(−L+ i∆x) = K∆x+O
(
(∆x)2
)
for all k = 1, . . . and i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. Since the integrands in the convolution integrals of
ω ~k ω are piecewise smooth (we omit details here), it also has to hold
Cki − (ω˜ ~k ω˜)(−L+ i∆x) = K∆x+O
(
(∆x)2
)
(C.25)
for some constant K independent of n.
Using (C.25) and the Euler–Maclaurin formula and the fact that the expressions in (C.24)
are piecewise smooth, verifies the assumption (C.24).
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D Auxiliary results
The following lemma is needed in the derivation of Newton’s iteration.
Lemma D.1. Let
f(ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)g(s) ds.
Then,
f ′(ε) = −
∫ ∞
ε
eε−sg(s) ds.
Proof. Writing
f(ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
g(s) ds− eε
∫ ∞
ε
e−sg(s) ds
and using the fundamental theorem of calculus and the chain rule, we see that
f ′(ε) = −g(ε)− eε
∫ ∞
ε
e−sg(s) ds+ eε · e−εg(ε) = −
∫ ∞
ε
eε−sg(s) ds.
Recall that for the error analysis we consider the neighbouring relation ∼R, i.e., we
consider the density function
ω(s) =
{
f(g(s))g′(s), if s > log(1− q),
0, otherwise,
where
f(t) =
1√
2piσ2
[qe
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q)e− t
2
2σ2 ], (D.1)
g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
. (D.2)
The following lemmas which are be needed in the analysis of the approximation error.
Lemma D.2. For all s ∈ (log(1− q),∞):
ω(s) ≤ σ
q
√
2pi
e
1
σ2 .
Proof. Consider first the case s ∈ (log(1 − q), 0]. We see that then g(s) ∈ (−∞, 12 ] and
therefore
e−
(g(s)−1)2
2σ2 ≤ e− g(s)
2
2σ2 .
Thus,
f(g(s)) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
e−
g(s)2
2σ2 . (D.3)
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Moreover, for all s ∈ (log(1− q), 0],
g′(s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) ≤
σ2
es − (1− q) . (D.4)
Using (D.3) and (D.4), we find that
ω(s) ≤ σ√
2pi
e−
g(s)2
2σ2
es − (1− q) . (D.5)
We make the change of variables x = g(s). Then,
1
es − (1− q) = q
−1 e
−2x+1
2σ2
and from (D.5) we see that
ω(s) ≤ σ
q
√
2pi
e
−x2
2σ2 e
−2x+1
2σ2 =
σ
q
√
2pi
e
1
σ2 e
−(x+1)2
2σ2 ≤ σ
q
√
2pi
e
1
σ2
which shows the claim for s ∈ (log(1− q), 0].
Assume next s ≥ 0. Then,
g′(s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) =
σ2
1− 1−qes
≤ σ
2
q
.
Since f(g(s)) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
, we see that when s > 0,
ω(s) ≤ σ
q
√
2pi
.
Lemma D.3. For all s ≥ 1 and 0 < q ≤ 12 :
ω(s) ≤ σe−−(σ
2s+C)2
2σ2 ,
where C = σ2 log( 12q )− 12 .
Proof. Since s ≥ 1,
es − (1− q) ≥ 1
2
es
and therefore
g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
≥ σ2s+ C,
where C = σ2 log( 12q ) +
1
2 . We see that C ≥ 12 , since 0 < q ≤ 12 . Then also
f(g(s)) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
e−
−(σ2s+C)2
2σ2 ,
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Furthermore, when s > 1,
g′(s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) ≤ 2σ
2.
Thus, when s > 1,
ω(s) ≤ σ
√
2
pi
e−
−(σ2s+C2)2
2σ2 ≤ σe−−(σ
2s+C2)
2
2σ2 .
D.1 Bounds for derivatives
Lemma D.4. Suppose σ ≥ 1. For all s ∈ (log(1− q),∞):
|ω′(s)| ≤ 4e 3σ2 σ
3
q2
and
|ω′′(s)| ≤ 11e 92σ2 σ
3
q3
.
Proof. Denote
ω(s) = f(g(s))g′(s),
where
g(s) = σ2 log
(
es − (1− q)
q
)
+
1
2
(D.6)
and
f(t) =
1√
2piσ2
[qe
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q)e− t
2
2σ2 ].
Straightforward calculation shows that
ω′(s) = f ′(g(s))(g′(s))2 + f(g(s))g′′(s) (D.7)
and
ω(2)(s) = f ′′(g(s))(g′(s))3 + 3f ′(g(s))g′′(s)g′(s) + f(g(s))g(3)(s). (D.8)
Moreover,
g′(s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q) ,
g′′(s) = − σ
2(1− q)es(
es − (1− q))2 ,
g(3)(s) =
σ2(1− q)es(es + (1− q))(
es − (1− q))3 .
(D.9)
Case s ≥ 0. When s ≥ 0, it holds
es
es − (1− q) =
1
1− 1−qes
≤ 1
q
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and from this inequality and expressions (D.9) it follows that
|g′(s)| ≤ σ
2
q
,
|g′′(s)| ≤ σ
2
q2
,∣∣∣g(3)(s)∣∣∣ ≤ 2σ2
q3
.
(D.10)
Notice that when s ≥ 0, g(s) ≥ 12 . By an elementary calculus, we find that when σ ≥ 1, for
t ≥ 12 it holds
f(t) ≤ 1
σ
,
f ′(t) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
t
σ
e−
(t−1)2
2σ2 ≤ 1
σ
f ′′(t) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
(
t2
σ2
+
1
σ2
)
e−
(t−1)2
2σ2 ≤ 2
σ3
.
(D.11)
Substituting (D.11) and (D.10) into (D.7) and (D.8) we find that
|ω′(s)| ≤ 2σ
3
q2
,
|ω′′(s)| ≤ 7σ
3
q3
.
(D.12)
when s ≥ 0.
Case s ∈ (log(1− q, 0)). When s ∈ (log(1− q), 0), from (D.9) it follows that
|g′(s)| ≤ σ
2
es − (1− q) ,
|g′′(s)| ≤ σ
2(
es − (1− q))2 ,∣∣∣g(3)(s)∣∣∣ ≤ 2σ2(
es − (1− q))3 .
(D.13)
Consider next the five terms on the right hand sides of (D.7) and (D.8). Consider first the
term f(g(s))g′′(s). By (D.13), we have the bound
f(g(s))g′′(s) ≤ f(g(s)) σ
2(
es − (1− q))2 . (D.14)
Next, make the change of variables x = g(s). Then, since (see (D.6))
1
es − (1− q) = q
−1 e
−2x+1
2σ2 , (D.15)
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the bound (D.14) gives
f(g(s))g′′(s) ≤ σ2q−2f(x)e −4x+22σ2 ≤ σ2q−2e 3σ2 1√
2piσ2
e
−(x+2)2
2σ2 ≤ 1√
2pi
e
3
σ2
σ
q2
, (D.16)
as f(t) ≤ 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2 for t ≤ 12 and g(s) ≤ 12 for s ∈ (log(1− q, 0)). With a similar technique,
i.e., by using the change of variables x = g(s) and (D.15), we find after tedious calculation
that
f ′(g(s))
(
g′(s)
)2 ≤ 3e 3σ2 σ3
q2
,
f ′′(g(s))
(
g′(s)
)3 ≤ 6e 92σ2 σ3
q3
,
3f ′(g(s))g′′(s)g′(s) ≤ 4e 92σ2 σ
3
q3
,
f(g(s))g(3)(s) ≤ 1√
2pi
e
9
2σ2
σ
q3
.
(D.17)
Substituting (D.16) and (D.17) into (D.7) and (D.8) gives the bounds
|ω′(s)| ≤ 4e 3σ2 σ
3
q2
,
|ω′′(s)| ≤ 11e 92σ2 σ
3
q3
(D.18)
for all s ∈ (log(1− q, 0)).
The claim follows from the bounds (D.12) and (D.18).
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